Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (with Alma Cohen and David Weiss), CEPR DP 14513, under review
This study investigates whether CEOs' political preferences are associated with the representation and compensation of women among non-CEO top executives at U.S. public companies. We find that CEOs who more strongly identify with the Republican party are associated with fewer women in the executive suite. To explore causality, we use an event study approach to show that replacing a Republican with a Democratic CEO increases female representation in the executive suite. Finally, gender gaps in the level and performance-sensitivity of compensation are larger under Republican CEOs. Our results are consistent with no such gaps existing in companies run by Democratic CEOs.
Why is Labor Productivity in Israel so Low? Forthcoming in The Israeli Economy in the Last Twenty Years: Lights and Shadows in a Market Economy, Cambridge University Press (with Shay Tsur). Also, CEPR DP 14011
We analyze differences in labor productivity between Israel and a group of small OECD countries. We assume a more general human capital production function and calibrate it using PIAAC surveys, which examine the literacy and numeracy skills of the adult population in the OECD countries. Whereas Israel has more years of schooling, its population has lower measured skills. Using development accounting exercise, we show that once years of schooling and numeracy skills are taken into account, differences in accumulated factors explain more than three-quarters of the gap. This is against a split of 60-40 between accumulated factors and total factor productivity, when these skills are ignored. Additionally, using panel data on 13 OECD countries we show strong positive correlation between physical and human capital per worker at the industry level. A causal interpretation of our estimates implies that closing the gap in skills will indirectly close 18 percent of the gap in physical capital.
Women's Liberation as a Financial Innovation, Journal of Finance, Vol. 74, pp. 2915-2956, December 2019. (with David Weiss and Hosny Zoabi).
Abstract: In one of the greatest extensions of property rights in human history, common law countries began giving rights to married women in the 1850s. Before this “women’s liberation,” the doctrine of coverture strongly incentivized parents of daughters to hold real estate, rather than financial assets such as money, stocks, or bonds. We exploit the staggered nature of coverture’s demise across U.S. states to show that women’s rights led to shifts in household portfolios, a positive shock to the supply of credit, and a reallocation of labor toward nonagriculture and capital-intensive industries. Investor protection thus deepened financial markets, aiding industrialization.